Well, this is not LSC-555. it is actually LSC-557. But it was buried in a remarks section on Blackboard and I decided to give it more prominence here. Enjoy!
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (CIPB) established during the Bush II administration is an inter-agency entity charged with creating and implementing a national strategy to protect and “contain” the critical information infrastructure across a number of foreign affairs related agencies (Rubin, 2010). On the surface, that sounds rather benign, and even rather technical, because it sounds like it pertains to machines that carry the information, not the information itself.
However, at the agency level, the existence of the CIPB can be a bit troublesome. In terms of information policy, the ALA (American Library Association) and other agencies have a very well-founded fear regarding the potential and/or effects of the CIPB to withdraw or restrict government information that may have been otherwise available to the public (Rubin, 2010, p. 325). Especially, or perhaps even more significantly, the CIPB creates the potential for an information “detour,” i.e., the withdrawal or restriction of information that should be available to Congressional committees who are charged with oversight of the operations of those organizations, such as Homeland Security, State, FBI, IRS, etc.
In the wrong hands, the CIPB allows for the creation of a “cloak of secrecy” within an agency that provides for limited collection and destruction of information that might prove detrimental to that agency’s political leadership, a climate of secrecy that cannot be penetrated by Congressional committees who represent the American people, in a broad sense. The ALA 2003 report mentioned in Rubin is precisely on point in this regard.
Here is a link to the ALA report: http://wikis.ala.org/godort/index.php/Resolution_on_restrictions_on_access_to_government_information